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Abstract
The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs
through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in future labor income tax revenue
on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduc-
tion in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out
of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect be-
cause (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply
already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those
who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change
in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the
overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the
art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint dis-
tribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the
size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find
that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates,
it obtains an additional 9 Cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value)
through higher labor supply of (non-)heirs.
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1 Introduction
Inheritances are of growing importance for Western economies. Using data from France,
Piketty (2011) shows that since the 1950s the annual flow of inheritances has been ever
increasing, so that in 2010 it amounted to roughly 15 percent of national income. He
also predicts that this share could become as large as 25 percent in the mid 21st cen-
tury. Following his theoretical arguments, it is quite likely that a similar (and poten-
tially even stronger) trend should be observed in other countries with low economic
and population growth such as Spain, Italy and Germany (Piketty, 2011, p.1077). This
development clearly highlights the increasing power of an inheritance tax in raising
revenue.1
Despite the apparent importance of the topic, the incentive costs of inheritance taxation
are not very well understood (Kopczuk, 2013a). Measuring them empirically is a com-
plicated task, because wealth transfers “are infrequent (at the extreme, occurring just
at death), thereby allowing for a long period of planning, making expectations about
future tax policy critical and empirical identification of the effect of incentives particu-
larly hard” (Kopczuk, 2013a, p.330). Furthermore, inheritances shape incentives along
various dimensions, like wealth accumulation, labor supply and entrepreneurship.
In this paper we make progress on understanding and quantifying the revenue effects
of inheritance taxation by elaborating one particular channel, the labor supply of heirs.
More specifically, we tackle the following policy question:
For each Euro of revenue raised directly through inheritance taxes, how much ad-
ditional labor income tax revenue from heirs can the government expect to obtain?
Note that, while the focus of this paper remains with this purely positive questions,
the size of the labor supply effects of heirs would also serve as an important ingredient
in an optimal inheritance tax model, see Kopczuk (2013b).
Answering such a question purely empirically is problematic, because it is difficult to
directly identify the impact of inheritances on the earnings of heirs. One reason for
this is that inheritances can be (imperfectly) anticipated and therefore already shape
labor earnings prior to receipt. Furthermore, settings with exogenous variation in
inheritances are rare.2 By contrast, there exists quasi-experimental evidence regard-
ing the wealth effect of lottery gains on labor income (Imbens et al., 2001; Cesarini
et al., 2017), which, owing to the small likelihood of their occurrence, can be regarded
1 We use the terms bequest taxes and inheritance taxes interchangeably in this paper, albeit the fact
that their effects might be different once an individual bequeathes to more than one heir and tax
schedules are not proportional. For the experiments carried out in this paper, such a distinction,
however, plays no role.
2 There exists a small empirical literature on this issue to which we relate in the literature review
below.
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as exogenous. Our methodological approach consists in calibrating a version of the
workhorse life-cycle model of the macroeconomics literature to be consistent with this
quasi-experimental evidence on lottery gains and subsequently examining our policy
question through the lens of this model.
As a theoretical warm-up, we first set up a simple two-period overlapping generations
framework with stochastic bequests to analyze the tax revenue effects of a change in
the bequest tax rate. We formally isolate the revenue effect that is due to the labor sup-
ply of (potential) heirs. We show that the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned
income is not a sufficient statistic for the change in heirs’ life-cycle labor supply (and
therefore labor tax revenue), because an increase in the bequest tax is not an unan-
ticipated reduction in wealth. Owing to anticipation, two effects arise on top of the
simple standard wealth effect: (i) Individuals do form expectations about the inheri-
tances they will receive and accordingly adjust their labor supply prior to receipt. (ii)
If inheritances are stochastic, even individuals who did not inherit, but assigned a pos-
itive probability to receiving an inheritance, adjust their life-cycle labor supply.
We then study the quantitative importance of these effects in a state of the art life-
cycle model. Our model features consumption, labor supply and savings decisions,
heterogeneous labor productivity profiles and realistic expectations about the size and
timing of bequests. We calibrate it to the German economy, with our most impor-
tant target being the joint distribution of the size and timing of inheritances and labor
earnings. To achieve credible magnitudes for the implied wealth effects, we target
quasi-experimental evidence on wealth effects based on lottery gains (Cesarini et al.,
2017). Specifically, we distribute lottery gains of different sizes among individuals of
different ages in our model in the same way as they are distributed in the data set of Ce-
sarini et al. (2017). We then measure the resulting impulse response function for labor
earnings and vary preference parameters until the model predicted impulse response
matches the empirical one.
The only feature of our model, for which neither quasi-experimental evidence nor sur-
vey data provide us with clear guidance for calibration are expectations about the size
of inheritances. Different assumptions on rational expectations can be consistent with
the cross-sectional distribution of inheritances and earnings of heirs. We therefore con-
sider a class of expectations that captures two special cases as polar outcomes: Condi-
tional on the date at which the bequeather dies as well as the recipient’s earnings (i) all
individuals draw their inheritance from the empirical cross-sectional distribution, and
(ii) all heirs know for sure how much they inherit. Besides these two polar cases, we
consider linear combinations of the two that are all consistent with the cross-sectional
joint distribution of inheritances and earnings of heirs.
Equipped with this quantitative model, we conduct the following policy experiment:
We let the government levy a proportional tax of 1 percent on all bequests and calculate
the resulting change in lifetime income and income tax payments for the total popula-
tion of our model. For our benchmark calibration, we find that any Euro of bequests
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that is taken away from heirs increases their lifetime income by around 22 Cents in
net present value, meaning discounted to the year of inheritance receipt. In terms of
income tax payments this means that any Euro of revenue directly obtained through
bequest taxes leads to additional tax revenues of around 9 cents (in net present value).
We decompose this number along two dimensions. First, we show that anticipation
effects constitute approximately half of the total effect. This highlights the importance
of considering a model with expectations and not only relying on a simple back-of-
the envelope calculation, where one would focus on post-inheritance earnings of heirs
only. More generally, our approach quantifies the bias that would occur in an estima-
tion which would focus solely only the labor supply changes of heirs after the receipt
of an inheritance and would ignore anticipation effects as well as labor supply changes
of non-heirs. Second, we consider heterogeneity in effects and answer our policy ques-
tion for households of different earnings levels. We find that the effect of receiving an
inheritance on individual labor earnings is increasing in earnings of heirs. This simply
reflects the fact that lowering leisure by one hour is associated with a higher earnings
gain for individuals with higher productivity.
Finally, we show that our policy implications are rather insensitive to the assumptions
we make about how informed individuals are with respect to their inheritances. Only
in the polar case in which there is no uncertainty about the size of the inheritance
(and only uncertainty about timing remains) does this number increase significantly to
almost 10 instead of 9 Cents. We conclude that the additional labor tax revenue of heirs
is likely to be of sizable magnitude and should be taken into account in fiscal planning
(dynamic scoring).3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first give a short overview
over the related literature. In Section 2 we illustrate the main mechanisms within a
tractable two-period OLG model. In Section 3 we describe the full life-cycle model. We
discuss our parameterization of expectations in Section 4. The calibration is explained
in Section 5. In Section 6 we present our results and perform several robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature. The paper is related to and motivated by a small but growing
quasi-experimental literature of wealth effects on labor supply. Imbens et al. (2001) is
the first paper to use lottery data to estimate the impact of wealth on labor supply. They
document that, on average, a one dollar wealth increase triggers a decrease in earnings
of 11 Cents. Cesarini et al. (2017) use a similar setting in Sweden and obtain surpris-
ingly similar numbers. Picchio et al. (2015) study lottery winners in the Netherlands.
While they find no effects along the extensive margin, the impact along the intensive
margin is a bit smaller than in Imbens et al. (2001) and Cesarini et al. (2017). Gelber
et al. (2017) analyze the wealth effect for individuals who receive disability insurance.
3 To put this number into perspective, note that Saez et al. (2012) report the marginal excess burden
per dollar of federal income tax raised to be below 20 cents.
3
The individuals they consider receive around $1,700 of DI benefits per month. The
sample is particular in the sense that monthly income among the studied subjects is
very low, on average around $200 per month. The authors have a very clean identifi-
cation strategy (regression-kink design) and find an income effect from one dollar of
additional unearned income of about 20 Cents.4
Further, our paper is related to the literature that estimates the impact of inheritances
on the labor supply of heirs. Papers along these lines include Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993),
who document the effect of bequests on labor force participation, and Brown et al.
(2010), who investigate retirement choices. In a recent study Doorley and Pestel (2016)
use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to analyze the effect of inheritances on
(actual and desired) hours worked, self-employment and hiring of entrepreneurs. The
authors find that women who receive an inheritance reduce their labor supply by about
1.5 hours a week, while men’s labor supply is by and large unaffected.
More relatedly, Elinder et al. (2012) examine the influence of inheritances on the earn-
ings of heirs and use variation in the size of inheritances for identification. The sample
they consider is very small, however. They do find effects on earnings that are signifi-
cantly larger than the ones implied by our model. Bø et al. (2018) study the impact of
bequests on labor earnings examining Norwegian administrative data with a propen-
sity score matching approach. They find an effect that is roughly 50 percent below the
one determined in our model. Yet, they only look at the labor supply reaction of heirs
upon receipt of an inheritance and ignore anticipation effects. As shown in our quanti-
tative analysis, the resulting bias from omitting anticipation effects can be expected to
amount to roughly half of the total effect. Hence, the results in Bø et al. (2018) are by
and large consistent with our findings.
A recent related public economics paper is Koeniger and Prat (2018), who analyze the
policy implications of wealth effects. In a dynastic Mirrleesian environment, they find
that such wealth effects create a force for less educational investment of children from
wealthy families.
2 A Two-Period OLG Framework
In this section, we illustrate our general ideas using a simple two-period overlapping
generations framework. At each point in time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}, there are two gener-
ations alive, the sizes of which we normalize to one without loss of generality. From
one period to the next, the older of the two generations dies, the younger generation
turns old and a new generation is born. We denote by j = 1, 2 the age of a generation.
4 Another recent related study is Bick et al. (2018), who document differences in hours worked across
countries at different development stages. They find that both labor force participation (extensive
margin) and hours worked conditional on employment (intensive margin) are lower in high income
countries. This pattern is very much in line with wealth effects on labor supply.
4
Members of each generation have to decide about how much to consume c and how
much effort l to put into working. When old, they might receive an inheritance b with a
certain probability pi from their parent generation.5 In addition, they can choose them-
selves how much of a bequest to leave to their descendants. In line with the recent
literature (see e.g. Piketty and Saez (2013)), we focus on the case where net bequests of
descendants directly enter the utility function instead of considering a dynastic Barro-
Becker model.
Lifetime utility of a household is given by
Ut = u(c1t, l1t) + β
[
pi · v
(
cI2t+1, l
I
2t+1, (1− τb)bIt+2
)
+ (1− pi) · v
(
cN2t+1, l
N
2t+1, (1− τb)bNt+2
) ]
, (1)
where I denotes the case in which the agent receives an inheritance and N the case
in which she does not. The instantaneous utility functions u and v are assumed to
be strictly increasing and concave in c and (1− τb)b as well as strictly decreasing and
convex in l.
The agent maximizes her lifetime utility given the budget constraint
c1t + at+1 ≤ (1− τl)w1l1t + T1 (2)
in the first period and the state-dependent constraints in period two
cK2t+1 + b
K
t+2 ≤ (1− τl)w2lK2t+1 + (1+ r)at+1
+ 1K=I(1− τb)bt+1 + T2 for K = I, N. (3)
In the first period, households use their labor earnings net of proportional labor taxes
τl as well as (potential) lump-sum transfers from the government to either consume
or save into the next period. When they are old, they split their net labor earnings,
gross savings, potential net bequest and the lump-sum transfer received between own
consumption and bequests to their descendants. Note that we assume prices to be
constant over time, but allow wages to be age dependent, reflecting potential wage
growth over the life cycle. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all bequests a
generation leaves to their descendants are pooled and then distributed evenly across
the group of heirs of the subsequent cohort.6 In order to guarantee that all bequests
are transferred to the descendant generation we require
pibt+2 = pibIt+2 + (1− pi)bNt+2, (4)
5 In the following, we use the words bequest and inheritance synonymously.
6 An alternative would be to create a dynastic model in which there is a direct link between parents
and children. This would complicate the analysis substantially in the theoretical section without
adding anything to the point we make in Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 below.
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which directly follows from the fact that only a share pi of the population receives an
inheritance.
Let us finally define the expected lifetime tax payments of the generation that is born
at time t in present value terms as
Rt = τl ·
[
y1t +
piyI2t+1 + (1− pi)yN2t+1
1+ r
]
+
piτbbt+1
1+ r
− T1 − T21+ r . (5)
Before thinking about how tax revenues change when bequest tax rates vary, let us first
define what an equilibrium and a steady state of the above model are.
Definition 1 Given an initial level of bequests b1, an equilibrium allocation is a set of house-
hold decision rules {c1t, at+1, cI2t+1, cN2t+1, bIt+2, bNt+2}∞t=0 that maximize the household’s utility
function (1) subject to the budget constraints (2) and (3), a set of bequest levels {bt}∞t=2 that is
consistent with (4) and a set of lifetime tax revenues {Rt}∞t=0 derived from (5).
A steady state is an equilibrium allocation in which all variables are constant over time. We
denote a steady state allocation as {c1, a, cI2, cN2 , bI , bN, b, R}.
2.1 The Effect of Changes in Bequests on Household Labor Earnings
In our modeling framework, we now want to work towards clarifying what the effect
of a change in the proportional bequest tax τb on the lifetime tax payment Rt of a
generation born in t is. Before, we however need to define how labor earnings at
different stages of the life cycle of a household respond to exogenous variations in
unearned income, as these responses will help us in expressing our target effect in a
straightforward and easy way.
Definition 2 Let us define
η1 = − dy1dT1
∣∣∣∣
da=0
, ηK2 = −
dyK2
dT2
∣∣∣∣∣
da=0
and α = −(1+ r) · da
d [(1− τb)b] .
η1 and ηK2 denote the instantaneous wealth effects on labor earnings, meaning the decline in
labor earnings as a result of an exogenous increase in lump-sum transfers under the assumption
that savings are kept constant. α is the reaction in savings to an exogenous increase in the
amount of bequests heirs receive at old age.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of a change in the net-of-tax-rate
1− τb on household labor earnings in different periods of life, evaluated and linearized
around a steady state with a constant tax rate τb.
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Proposition 1 A change in the net-of-tax rate on bequests 1− τb leads to a total labor earnings
reaction of
dy1
d(1− τb) · b = −η1 · (1+ ε) ·
α
1+ r
and (6)
dyK2
d(1− τb) · b = −η
K
2 · (1+ ε) [−1K=I + α] + ηK2 · ξKτ , (7)
where
ε =
db
d(1− τb) ·
1− τb
b
is the elasticity of bequests the household receives with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1− τb. ξKτ
measures the effect of a change in the net-of-tax-rate 1− τb on the willingness of a household of
type K = I, N to bequeath to her own descendants.
Proof: see Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 tells us that upon an exogenous change in the net-of-tax-rate, the house-
hold labor earnings reaction has three components. First, there is a direct wealth effect
on the earnings yI2 of those who inherit some bequests. Second, in anticipation of a
change in future bequest levels, the household can adjust her savings behavior in pe-
riod one, which influences labor supply in period 1 as well as labor supply of both
household types in period 2. Note that the intensity of the wealth effect on labor sup-
ply is itself due to two components: On the one hand, a net-of-tax rate increase leads to
a mechanical wealth effect, on the other hand, the change in the net-of-tax rate might
induce some behavioral reactions on the parent’s bequeathing behavior. The sum of
the two effects is captured in the term 1 + ε, where ε measures the elasticity of gross
bequests a household receives from her parents with respect to the net-of-tax rate. Fi-
nally, when the tax rate on bequests declines, leaving bequests to her own descendants
becomes more attractive to the household. Note that owing to our specification of
utility, this argument holds for net bequests. A change in 1− τb, however, already me-
chanically leads to a rise in net bequests. The extent to which this influences the gross
bequest level bK is measured by the parameter ξKτ , the sign of which is ambiguous. In
any case, whether gross bequests increase (ξKτ > 0) or decrease (ξKτ < 0), labor supply
will have to adjust accordingly, which is captured by ηK2 · ξKτ .
The following corollary shows that we can put a lot of structure on these wealth effects
if we impose the assumption that all goods are normal goods.
Corollary 1 If consumption and leisure in both periods as well as bequests are normal goods,
we have
η1 ≥ 0 , ηK2 ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0.
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Hence, if the assumptions in the preceding corollary hold, we can expect that upon an
increase in expected net bequests in the second period:
(i) The household generates less labor earnings in the case she receives an inheri-
tance in period two owing to the direct wealth effect.
(ii) In order to smooth consumption and leisure over time, she also lowers her sav-
ings.
(iii) The savings reaction leads to lower labor earnings in period 1, it dampens the
labor earnings reaction of those who inherit in period 2, and implies an increase
in labor earnings for those who did not inherit in period 2.
(iv) Finally, the household either increases (or decreases) gross bequests to her de-
scendants, which has an additional positive (or negative) effect on labor supply.
2.2 Bequest Taxes and Cohorts’ Lifetime Tax Payments
Knowing what happens to labor earnings when bequest levels change, we can now
look at how a cohort’s lifetime tax payment changes upon the increase of bequest taxes.
We therefore conduct the following thought experiment. We assume that our model
is in a steady state. At some date s, the government changes the level of the bequest
tax by a (marginal) amount dτb. This change is not anticipated by households. Hence,
the old generation at time s – the one born in s− 1 – is surprised by this change. Since
bequests are predetermined by the decisions of the generation born at date s− 2, the
change in bequests received by generation s− 1 is
d [(1− τb) · bs] = d(1− τb) · bs = −dτb · b,
where b is the level of bequests in the steady state prior to the tax reform. Now, as
a result to this change in net bequests received as well as to the change in the price
of bequests through higher taxes, the old households in period s adapt the amount of
bequests they leave to their descendants to a level bs+1. Having received a different
amount of inheritance, the next generation then again changes its bequeathing behav-
ior etc., which leads us to a series of new bequest levels
b = bs, bs+1, bs+2, . . . or in differences 0 = dbs, dbs+1, dbs+2, . . .
until bequests finally converge to a new steady state value. Let us again define the
elasticity of bequests that a household receives from her parent’s generation at time t
with respect to the net-of-tax-rate 1− τb as7
εt =
dbt
d(1− τb) ·
1− τb
bt
≥ 0.
7 In the same way as in Proposition 1.
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With this elasticity definition, we can obviously write
dbt = εt · bt1− τb · d(1− τb) where εs = 0.
Proposition 2 The change in lifetime tax payments of a cohort born at time t ≥ s to a change
in bequest taxes dτb – which comes surprisingly at a date s – is given by
dRt = pi ·
d
[
τbbt+1
]
1+ r
·
{
1+
τl
pi
[
1− τb1−τb · εt+1
] ·{ (1+ εt+1) ·
[
αη1 + pi
[
η I2 − αη I2
]
+ (1− pi)
[
−αηN2
] ]
−
[
piη I2ξ
I
τ + (1− pi)ηN2 ξNτ
]}
. (8)
For the cohort born at date s− 1 we have
dRs−1 = pi · dτb · bs1+ r ·
{
1+
τl
pi
·
[
piη I2 −
[
piη I2ξ
I
τ + (1− pi)ηN2 ξNτ
] ]}
.
Proof: see Appendix A. 
Before we interpret these equations, note that the total revenue effect of a change in
bequest taxes has a direct component8 as well as an additional component through
changes in labor supply behavior and a corresponding impact on labor tax revenue. In
order to isolate the latter and explore by how much lifetime tax payments of a cohort
rise in excess of the bequest taxes it pays, we normalize Rt by the expected bequest tax
payment of the generation born in period t.
Corollary 2 The change in lifetime tax payments in excess of the bequest tax revenue effect is
dEt =
τl
pi
[
1− τb1−τb · εt+1
] ·{ (1+ εt+1) · [αη1 + pi [η I2 − αη I2]+ (1− pi) [−αηN2 ] ]
−
[
piη I2ξ
I
τ + (1− pi)ηN2 ξNτ
]}
(9)
for all generations born in period t ≥ s and
dEs−1 =
τl
pi
·
{
piη I2 −
[
piη I2ξ
I
τ + (1− pi)ηN2 ξNτ
]}
. (10)
Note that this corollary directly follows from
dEt =
dRt
pi · d
[
τbbt+1
]
1+r
− 1.
8 Reflected in the term 1 in parenthesis and simply indicating that higher bequest taxes will (at least
on the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve) lead to higher bequest tax revenues.
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Hence, for each dollar of bequest tax revenue the government receives (in present value
terms) from a generation t that is affected by an increase in proportional bequest taxes
dτb, it obtains an additional dEt dollars of labor tax revenue. The effect dEt thereby
consists of multiple components. Starting with the old generation at the time of the
bequest tax increase in equation (10), we can directly see two effects at work. All
households of this generation are surprised by the change in taxes. Since they are
already old, the only margin by which they can react to this change is to adjust their
current consumption and labor earnings as well as the amount of bequest they leave
to their descendants. All households of type i who receive an inheritance therefore
experience a negative wealth effect of dτb · b, which directly translates into higher labor
earnings. The size of this wealth effect is given by η I2, which measures the households
willingness to earn out of unearned income, holding fix life cycle savings. Non-heirs,
of course, experience no wealth effect.
Yet, an increase in bequest taxes also induces a price effect, which has an impact on
the households’ willingness to leave bequests to their own descendants. This channel
is summarized in the second term of equation (10). ξKτ measures the extent to which
households of type K = I, N adjust their gross bequests to a change in the tax rate dτb.
Note that ξKτ itself is a result of two effects. On the one hand, an increase in the tax rate
τb makes bequeathing to the descendants less attractive, which is why – if all goods
are normal – households want to reduce their level of net bequests. However, at the
same time, the tax change dτb already mechanically reduces net bequest by an amount
of dτb · bKt , where bKt is the level of gross bequests. If dτb · bKt is smaller (larger) than the
household’s desired decline in net bequests, then the agent will also lower (increase)
her gross bequest level bKt . As a result, she will require less (more) labor earnings which
mitigates (reinforces) the wealth effects.
With these effects in mind, let us turn to the excess tax revenue of all generations born
at time t ≥ s in equation (9). We can immediately see that the same effects are at work
for this generation. However, the wealth effect is now a product of three subcompo-
nents:
αη1︸︷︷︸
Anticipation Effect
+pi
[
η I2 − αη I2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Heirs
+ (1− pi)
[
−αηN2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect on Non-Heirs
. (11)
The term piη I2 again covers the direct wealth effect that we would observe if a gen-
eration was hit by the tax change unexpectedly in the middle of their life. Since all
households born at a time t ≥ s however observe the increased bequest tax rate al-
ready in the first period of life, there is an anticipation effect. Specifically, all members
of a cohort will try to smooth the impact of a smaller expected inheritance over their
life cycle. As a result, if all goods are normal, they lower consumption in period one
in order to increase savings into the next period. This leads labor earnings to already
increase prior to a (potential) bequest tax receipt (αη1). The savings increase in turn in-
duces an additional positive wealth effect on households when old. Hence, it mitigates
the labor earnings reaction of heirs and induces non-heirs’ labor earnings to even fall
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below their steady state earnings level.
Over and above the three labor supply effects discussed so far, there is a fourth effect
in equation (9), which relates to the impact the tax increase dτb has on the equilibrium
bequests received by generation t. By definition, bequests in the period of the reform
are predetermined, i.e. εs = 0. The old generation at time s will, however, adjust its
bequest level both owing to the wealth effect induced by a lower amount of inheritance
as well as to the price effect. This induces gross bequests of the next generation to
change. The factor 1+ εt+1 measures the exposure or equilibrium effect of each generation
that results from intertemporal spill-overs through the bequest channel. A greater εt+1,
hence, leads to a stronger decline in the net bequests the generation born at time t
receives and therefore induces stronger wealth effects on labor earnings. Note that the
price effect does not depend on εt+1, as it is merely a consequence of the change in the
price of bequests dτb, where this price change is constant across all affected cohorts.
Summing up, we have shown that by increasing bequest taxes in our model, the gov-
ernment not only receives additional bequest tax revenue, it can also expect a rise in
labor taxes paid by each generation. The extent to which labor earnings actually in-
crease is the product of
1. a direct wealth effect on heirs through a fall in net inheritances,
2. an anticipation effect leading to a smoothing of labor earnings (also for individuals
that are ex-post non-heirs) over the life cycle and therefore changes in savings,
3. a price effect associated with the behavioral reaction to a change in the price of net
bequests, and
4. an equilibrium effect that results from intergenerational spill-overs and that leads
to a different extent of the wealth and anticipation effect for generations born at
different points in time.
In the following analysis, we concentrate on the first two effects, since they can be
traced by suitably calibrating a quantitative model to quasi-experimental evidence on
the wealth effects on labor earnings. The price and equilibrium effects, on the other
hand, require a careful specification of bequest motives and the sensitivity of bequests
with respect to tax rates. Since evidence on the effects of bequest taxes on intergenera-
tional bequeathing behavior is scarce, we will leave these channels to future research.
In terms of our model, one can interpret this exercise as setting ξKτ = εt = 0 for all
t = 0, 1,∞. In this case, the excess tax payments associated with a change in propor-
tional bequest taxes can be summarized as
dEt =
τl
pi
·
[
αη1 + pi
[
η I2 − αη I2
]
+ (1− pi)
[
−αηN2
] ]
and dEs−1 = τl · η I2.
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3 Quantitative Life-Cycle Model
Our previous theoretical analysis has revealed that the anticipation of bequests plays a
crucial role in determining the labor supply response to a change in bequest taxes. In
the following sections we construct and calibrate a full life-cycle model, which allows
us to realistically quantify the effect of a change in bequest taxes on the labor supply
of heirs.
Timing and endowments Time t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is discrete and period length is one year.
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of heterogeneous households.
Households enter the economy at age 20 (model age t = 1). At this point in time, they
are endowed with an earnings ability level e ∈ {1, . . . , E} and a signal s ∈ {0, . . . , n}
about the amount of inheritance they might receive. Agents work until they reach the
(exogenous) retirement age tr. They die with certainty at age T.
Bequest and expectations Throughout their life-cycle, households might receive a be-
quest. Bequests are stochastic both with respect to timing and size. We assume that
a household can only inherit once in her lifetime – at the age at which her ancestors
pass away. Denote by {pet}Tt=1 the unconditional probability distribution of ancestors
passing away when a household of ability e is of age t. We assume that the chance of
parents surviving their children is zero, i.e. ∑Tt=1 p
e
t = 1.
When a household’s parents die at time t, their bequest can take one of n + 1 different
levels {beit}ni=0, where be0t = 0. We call i ∈ {0, . . . , n} a bequest class and assume that
the conditional probability of the household’s inheritance falling into such a class is
time invariant. Agents form expectations about the class their inheritance will belong
to according to the signal s they received at the beginning of their life cycle. A signal
of perfect quality would imply that a household falls into inheritance class i = s with
certainty. We will also consider less precise signals and will be more specific about how
we formalize the quality of the signal in the next section. For now, we just denote by
pieis the time invariant probability that a household with signal s and earnings capacity
e attaches to receiving an inheritance of class i. The probability that an individual of
type (e, s) receives a bequest at age t that falls into class i is then given by pet · pieis.
While the probability distribution over bequest classes i is time invariant, bequest lev-
els beit in each class are allowed to vary over time t. This reflects, for example, that
ancestors might run down their wealth throughout a prolonged retirement phase. Fur-
thermore, the bequest levels beit depend on the individual earnings capacity e, which
provides more flexibility in matching the empirical correlation between earnings and
bequests received.
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Preferences At any age t, households decide about how much to consume ct, how
much to work lt and how much to save at. They have preferences over consumption
and labor supply
U0(e, s) = E
[
T
∑
t=1
βt−1
(
c1−γt
1− γ −
l1+χt
1+ χ
) ∣∣∣∣∣ e, s
]
and form expectations about inheritances according to the above probabilities. We
assume utility of consumption and disutility of labor to be additively separable. The
parameter χ denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, β is the time
discount factor, and γ is risk aversion.9
Budget constraint The budget constraint is given by
ct + at+1 = wet lt − T (wet lt) + P et +Wt. (12)
Consumption and savings into the next period are financed out of gross labor income
wet lt minus taxes T (wet lt), pension income P et and net wealth Wt. Gross labor income is
the product of the wage rate wet and labor effort lt. The function T (.) maps gross labor
income into a tax payment and is specified in more detail in the calibration section of
this paper. Throughout retirement, the household receives pension income P et , which
we assume to be constant and conditional on the household’s earnings capacity.10 In
particular, we set
P et =
{
0 if t < tr
P e > 0 if t ≥ tr.
Net wealth is a composite of both individual savings at and (potential) bequests beit
received
Wt = [1+ r] at + (1− τb)beit,
where r is the interest rate on savings and τb is a proportional tax rate on bequests.
Finally, throughout her economic life, an agent cannot accumulate debt beyond a min-
imal asset level amin ∈ (−∞, 0]. In addition, she has to repay any outstanding debt
before death.
Retirement at age tr is mandatory. Hence labor supply needs to satisfy
lt = 0 for all t ≥ tr.
9 Note that contrary to the theoretical analysis in section 2, agents do not derive utility from leaving
bequests in this formulation. This assumption allows us to abstract from the price- and equilibrium
effect and instead focus on the direct wealth- and anticipation effect (see section 2.2).
10 It turns out that the variance in labor earnings across earnings categories is by an order of magnitude
higher than the variance within earnings categories. Hence, this is not a restrictive assumption.
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Dynamic optimization problem The state space of the household optimization problem
contains the individual’s earnings capacity e, the signal about the size of bequests s as
well as net wealth Wt. Since households only inherit once in their life time, the state
space further contains an indicator ht ∈ {0, 1} for whether the agent’s parents already
passed away prior to or at date t. The dynamic optimization problem of the household
hence reads
Vt(e, s, ht, Wt) = max
ct,lt,at+1
{
c1−γt
1− γ −
l1+χt
1+ χ
+ βE
[
Vt+1 (e, s, ht+1, Wt+1)
∣∣∣e, s, ht]}
subject to (12). If the household’s parents are still alive, expectations are formed ac-
cording to
E
[
Vt+1 (e, s, ht+1, Wt+1)
∣∣∣e, s, ht = 0] = p˜et+1 · n∑
i=0
pieis ·Vt+1 (e, s, 1, Wt+1,i)
+
[
1− p˜et+1
]
Vt+1 (e, s, 0, Wt+1) ,
where
Wt+1,i = [1+ r] at+1 + (1− τb)bei,t+1 and
Wt+1 = [1+ r] at+1.
Furthermore,
p˜et+1 =
pet+1
1−∑ts=1 pes
is the conditional probability of receiving an inheritance at age t + 1, given that one
hasn’t received an inheritance yet. In case the agent’s ancestors already deceased, all
uncertainty has been revealed and we can simply write
E
[
Vt+1 (e, s, ht+1, Wt+1)
∣∣∣e, s, ht = 1] = Vt+1 (e, s, 1, Wt+1) .
4 Parameterizing expectations about bequests
One important element of our life cycle model is the probability distribution pieis accord-
ing to which a household forms expectations about the class i her inheritance can fall
into, including the case where no inheritance is received i = 0. Measuring expectations
about inheritances is complicated if one can only observe actual cases of inheritances.
Whereas our data allows us to estimate the distribution of inheritances conditional on
age and earnings of the heirs, this does not inform us about the expectations, which
heirs in that age-earnings class actually had. We therefore suggest different parame-
terizations of the signal quality. We only require that they are all consistent with the
conditional cross-sectional distribution of inheritances. On the one extreme, we will
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consider signals of perfect quality: conditional on the parents dying, heirs know for
sure how much they inherit. On the other extreme, the signal contains no information
at all: heirs just draw their inheritance from the estimated cross-sectional distribution.
To elaborate how our results depend on expectations, we consider both extreme cases
as well as intermediate ones.
More formally, the signal s ∈ {0, . . . , n} an agent receives is a discrete number that
contains information about which class i her inheritance will fall into. The parameter
σ ∈ [0, 1] is an indicator for the quality of this signal. If σ = 0, the signal contains
no information at all, while for σ = 1 the household knows with certainty that i = s.
At the beginning of the life cycle, a fraction ϕes of households of ability e is equipped
with the signal s. We now have to make a distinction between the individual specific
probability distribution pieis, which depends on the individual signal s, as well as the
population wide (cross-sectional) distribution ωei of households of earnings class e over
different bequest levels i. In order for the individual probability distributions to be
consistent with the cross-sectional distribution, we require
∀i, e :
n
∑
s=0
ϕes · pieis = ωei . (13)
Note that when the signal is fully informative about the household’s bequest class
(σ = 1), the individual probability distribution is
pieis =
{
1 if i = s and
0 otherwise.
On the other hand, if the signal contains no information (σ = 0), the best forecast a
household can make about the class her inheritance will fall into is the cross-sectional
distribution over all households of the same earnings level ωei , meaning that pi
e
is = ω
e
i
for all s = 0, . . . , n. For any intermediate signal quality, we let the individual probabil-
ity distribution be a convex combination of the two. Hence, we have
pieis = (1− σ)ωei + σ · 1(i = s) for σ ∈ [0, 1],
where 1(i = s) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if i is equal to s and 0
otherwise. For any σ > 0, equation (13) directly implies
n
∑
s=0
ϕes ·
[
(1− σ)ωei + σ · 1(i = s)
]
= (1− σ)ωei + σϕei != ωei
and therefore ϕei = ω
e
i . Consequently, under rational expectations and for our choice
of pieis, the distribution of the population of an earnings level e over different signals s
has to exactly equal the cross-sectional distribution of this population over inheritance
levels i.
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5 Calibration
We calibrate our model in three steps:
1. We first estimate labor earnings profiles yet = w
e
t lt, the probability of ancestral
death pet , and the cross-sectional distribution of bequests b
e
it using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
2. In a second step, we parameterize further model parameters, prices and govern-
ment policies.
3. Finally, we jointly pin down the labor supply elasticity parameter χ, risk aversion
γ and the time discount factor β such that our model is consistent with recent
empirical evidence on the effects of lottery wins on labor earnings provided in
Cesarini et al. (2017).
5.1 Labor earnings and bequests
Our main data source is the GSOEP, an annual panel survey on German households.11
We use data on age, education, labor income and inheritances on the household level
in between the years 2000 and 2014, and pool together all data from these 15 different
waves into one cross-section.12 We assume that a household consists of either one or
two persons, meaning that we abstract from the presence of children or any other rel-
ative or non-relative household members. For two person households we identify the
household head as the primary earner and use the head’s age and education level in
all further calculations. We define household labor income as the sum of labor earn-
ings, public transfers (such as social assistance) and pension payments. In addition
to age, GSOEP provides data on whether the household has received an inheritance
in a respective survey year and if yes, about its size. To account for different house-
hold sizes, we divide gross labor income and inheritances of two person households
by 1.5, which equals the common scale parameter used by the OECD. Finally, we drop
all observations for which information on either age, education level, labor income or
inheritances are missing as well as all households aged 19 and below. This leaves us
with a total of 163,369 observations.
11 For detailed information about the GSOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007).
12 Note that we can not use data on the individual level, as the household is the only unit on which
inheritance data can be observed in the GSOEP. Note that we adjust labor income and inheritance
data using the CPI.
16
5.1.1 Labor earnings classes
We define a total of E = 8 different earnings classes, which result as a combination from
two education levels and four income groups per education levels. We first stratify our
sample according to the education level of the household. We say that a household has
a low education, if the highest educational degree of the household head is a secondary
or lower degree according to the ISCED97 education classification standard. All house-
holds with household head holding a tertiary education degree are considered highly
educated. We assign households with low education into earnings classes e = 1, 2, 3, 4
and those with high education into e = 5, 6, 7, 8. We then group all households of an
education level according to five year age bins, that is 20-24, 25-29, . . . , 60-64, and pool
all observations aged 65 and above into one bin. Within each education-age group, we
separate households into four quartiles according to their labor income, leading to 4
earnings classes within each educational group. Table 8 in Appendix B summarizes
mean earnings of the 8 earnings classes at different ages derived from the GSOEP. The
last row of this table shows the shares of households in each earnings class in the to-
tal population. This shows that in our sample 28.4 percent of household heads hold a
higher education degree.
In order to feed our model with annual data, we fit polynomials of the form
yet = exp
(
κe0 + κ
e
1 · t + κe2 · t2 + κe3 · t3 + κe4 · t4
)
(14)
for each earnings class e to our data. We derive the polynomial coefficients by mini-
mizing a simple residual sum of squares between the data reported in Table 8 and the
corresponding moments derived from the polynomial. Figure 1 shows the resulting
age-earnings profiles.
Figure 1: Estimated age-earnings profiles for different earnings classes
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Our model features endogenous labor supply decisions. Hence, labor earnings – the
product of labor effort lt and productivity wet – are an endogenous object. In order to
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back out labor productivity profiles that lead to the labor earnings profiles shown in
Figure 1, we follow the strategy proposed by Saez (2001). Note that, in our model,
labor productivity is assumed to be deterministic over the life cycle and utility from
consumption and disutility from labor are additively separable. In order to be able to
apply the strategy of Saez (2001), we have to make one additional simplifying assump-
tion, namely that instead of receiving bequests according to the risk process outlined
above, households of each earnings class e receive a lump-sum transfer in each period
of life that is equal to the average amount of bequest for this group, that is
Z et = pet ·
n
∑
i=0
ωei · beit.
In doing so, we eliminate all uncertainty from our model,13 which allows us to write
the household optimization problem as
max
cet ,y
e
t ,a
e
t+1
T
∑
t=1
βt−1
 (cet)1−γ1− γ −
[
yet
wet
]1+χ
1+ χ

s.t. cet + a
e
t+1 = y
e
t − T (yet) + P et +Z et + (1+ r)aet and aet+1 ≥ amin.
The first order conditions of this problem read
(cet)
−γ = β(1+ r)
(
cet+1
)−γ
+ αt with at+1 · αt = 0 and
(wet)
1+χ =
1
1− T ′(yet)
· (y
e
t)
χ
(cet)
−γ ,
where αt is the Lagrangian multiplier on the minimum asset constraint in instanta-
neous utility values. Given a government policy T (·) and P et , a set of lump sum trans-
fers Z et and a deterministic earnings path yet , we can use the Euler equation together
with the household budget constraint to calculate the deterministic consumption path
cet . We can then use the intra-period first order condition to back out the corresponding
labor productivity profile wet for households of earnings class e. Note that the resulting
productivity profile is only approximately correct, owing to the assumption we made.
However, comparing the model simulated average earnings path including bequest
uncertainty for each earnings class to the earnings profiles estimated from the data
showed only minor differences.
5.1.2 Probabilities of ancestral death and receiving and inheritance
Having grouped our observations into suitable earnings classes, we next have to es-
timate the age-dependent probability of ancestral death for members of each of these
13 Note that we only do this for the purpose of calibration, not in our main simulations.
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earnings groups. As inheritances arrive typically only onces or twice in a lifetime, re-
ceiving an inheritance is an infrequent event in our data. Hence, albeit the fact that we
have 163,369 observations, only 2,394 observed households (1.47 percent of our sam-
ple) received an inheritance in the sample period. In order to guarantee somewhat
reliable estimates, we therefore use a coarser definition of age groups, namely 20-34,
35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+ in what follows. For each earnings class e and age group,
we calculate the fraction of the observed population in the GSOEP that actually re-
ceived an inheritance. The results are shown in Table 9 and 10 in Appendix B. We
again fit this data using cubic log-polynomials
qet = exp
(
κe0 + κ
e
1 · t + κe2 · t2 + κe3 · t3
)
.
We weigh each moment in the residual sum of squares with the inverse of its stan-
dard error in order to control for the varying precision of our estimates. In addition,
to reduce the degrees of freedom, we assume that polynomials across households of
different earnings classes, but within the same education level (low or high), are only
allowed to vary in the intercept κ0. All other polynomial coefficients need to be identi-
cal for households of the same education level. Finally, we have to control for the fact
that a large number of households in our sample is composed of a head and a spouse,
and such couples tend to receive an inheritance twice in their lifetime, once from the
head’s parents and once from the spouse’s parents. In order to make the estimated
polynomials consistent with our model, we therefore standardize them with a factor
of 1 + ςe, where ςe is the fraction of two-person households in each earnings class e
in the GSOEP data. Figure 2 shows the resulting polynomials. The share of heirs in a
Figure 2: Estimated age-inheritance relationship for different earnings classes
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cohort is the highest around ages 50 to 60, which is consistent with a roughly 30 year
age difference between parents and children as well as a life expectancy of around 80
years. Higher educated households are more likely to receive an inheritance and tend
to get it later in life, mirroring a higher average life expectancy of their (potentially
high skilled) parents.
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Note that the estimated polynomials represent the share of a cohort that receives an
inheritance. In terms of our model, this share is a combination of the probability of
the parents deceasing and the likelihood that they pass a positive inheritance to their
offspring. Consequently, the polynomials identify
qet = p
e
t ·
n
∑
i=1
ωei = p
e
t · (1−ωe0).
Using our structural assumption that parents cannot outlive their children, we imme-
diately get
T
∑
t=1
qet = (1−ωe0)
T
∑
t=1
pet ⇔ ωe0 = 1−
T
∑
t=1
qet .
Furthermore, the probabilities of ancestral death are consequently given by
pet =
qet
∑Tt=1 q
e
t
.
5.1.3 Bequest classes and bequest levels
In a last step, we have to determine the cross-sectional distribution over (positive)
bequest classes ωei , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as well as the average bequest levels beit. To this end,
we first calculate mean bequests of households who received a positive inheritance
for each age group and earnings class in the GSOEP, see Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix
B. We again fit this data with cubic log-polynomials using the same methodology as
described in the previous section. Figure 3 shows the resulting mean bequest profile
by age and earnings level. Interestingly, the mean bequest profiles of the lower skilled
Figure 3: Estimated mean bequest profiles for different earnings classes
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are hump-shaped over the life cycle, while those of the high skilled are strictly upward
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sloping. This could indicate that bequests of parents of lower skilled households tend
to be “accidental”. If parents follow a regular life-cycle savings pattern and decumulate
their wealth at very high ages, bequests fall again. On the other hand, the fact that
bequests of parents of higher skilled households increase with the heirs’ age indicates
that parents consume less than their income speaking in favor of an active bequest
motive. This is in line with the view of de Nardi et al. (2010), who model bequests as a
luxury good.
In order to determine bequest levels in each bequest class i and for each skill level e, we
standardize the amount of inheritance of each household in the GSOEP who received
a positive bequest by the age group and earnings class specific mean bequest level
as reported in Tables 9 and 10. We then pool together all data for households of one
education level, separate the data into quartiles and calculate the mean standardized
bequest level for each of these quartiles. The resulting quartile means by education
level are shown in Table 1. The table reveals that the distribution of bequests within
Table 1: Standardizes bequest quartile means by education
Education Q1 (i = 1) Q2 (i = 2) Q3 (i = 3) Q4 (i = 4)
Low 0.070 0.232 0.611 3.095
High 0.070 0.258 0.704 2.971
the group of heirs is very skewed. While the lowest quartile of heirs receives an aver-
age inheritance that amounts to 7 percent of the mean bequest level, the upper quar-
tile’s inheritance ranges around three times the mean. The distribution does not differ
substantially across households of different education levels. We multiply the mean
bequest profiles in Figure 3 with the factors in the above table in order to construct
the bequest levels in each bequest class beit. Since we divided bequests into quartiles, a
share ωei = 0.25 · (1−ωe0) of households in earnings category e is in inheritance class i.
5.2 Parameters, prices and government policy
Table 2 summarizes our choices for parameters, prices and government policy. Starting
their life by the age of 20 (t = 1) we let households live with certainty up to age 80
(t = 61), which corresponds to the average life expectancy at birth of the German
population. Retirement is mandatory at age 65.
We set the coefficient of risk aversion to γ = 1.0, the labor supply elasticity parameter
to χ = 4.06, and the time discount factor to β = 0.981. Section 5.3 provides more
details on how we jointly pin down these three parameters. Finally, we set the signal
quality to σ = 0.75 in our benchmark scenario. We, however, consider various other
scenarios for σ in a sensitivity analysis.
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Table 2: Parameters, prices and government policy
Parameter Value Note
T 61 Age of death = 80
tr 46 Retirement age = 65
γ 1.0 Coefficient of risk aversion
χ 4.06 Frisch elasticity = 0.246
β 0.981 Time discount factor
σ 0.75 Signal quality (benchmark)
r 4% Interest rate
a0 0 No initial wealth
amin −∞ Only natural borrowing limit
P 0.40 Pension = 40% of average gross income
τ0 0.679 Average labor earnings tax rate
τ1 0.128 Progressivity of labor tax
τb 0.00 Linear inheritance tax
Taking a longer run perspective on savings, we take the annual interest rate to be 4%,
which is a long-run average return on a diversified portfolio that consists of both stocks
and bonds. We furthermore assume that households start their life with zero own
wealth. Finally, we assume that the only borrowing limit the household faces is the
natural borrowing limit, meaning that amin = −∞. We show in section 6.7 that this is
a conservative assumption and that the labor supply responses after a change in the
inheritance tax are even stronger, when agents are not allowed to borrow at all, that is
amin = 0.
Finally, we have to specify the tax and pension policy of the government. Starting
with the latter, we set the replacement rate of pensions to 40% of average gross labor
earnings over the life cycle, which matches the replacement rate reported by the OECD
(2017). We calculate pension payments separately for households of different earnings
classes, such that higher earners also receive a higher pension. With regard to labor
income taxes, we use data on the mapping from gross into net income provided by
Lorenz and Sachs (2016).14 We fit this data in a least squares sense using a functional
form that was first proposed by Benabou (2002) and more recently applied by Heath-
cote et al. (2017). We therefore write net income as a function of gross income as
ynet = y− T (y) = (1− τ0) · y1−τ1 ,
14 Note that we ignore implicit marginal tax rates that arise from transfer phase-out, since most heirs
are unlikely to be eligible for transfers anyway due to asset testing. Incorporating such additional
implicit marginal tax rates would strengthen the budgetary effect of bequest taxes through labor
supply adjustments.
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where τ0 roughly captures the average tax rate of the system and τ1 is an index for its
progressivity. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the relationship between gross labor
income on the x-axis and net labor income on the y-axis, both normalized to average
gross labor income. The blue line constitutes the original data, the red line is the fitted
tax schedule. The parameter set that yields the best match is τ0 = 0.321 as well as
τ1 = 0.128 with an R2 value of 0.998. The right panel of this figure compares the
resulting marginal tax rates.
Figure 4: Net Income and Marginal Tax Rates
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Last but not least, we assume that in our benchmark simulation bequests are not taxed,
which reflects very high exemption levels (400 000 Euro) for inheritances received from
parents.
5.3 Pinning own wealth effects on labor earnings
In our model, the elasticity of labor earnings in period t with respect to an exogenous
and unexpected increase in wealth is given by
ηy,t = − Wt − at+1 · ηa,t+1χ+τ1
γ · ct + (1− τ1) · [yt − T (yt)]
,
where ηa,t+1 is the elasticity of assets at+1 with respect to current wealth Wt, see Ap-
pendix C for a derivation of this relationship. Let us, for the moment, consider a static
environment without savings, i.e. assume that ηa,t+1 = 0. In this case, the extent of
the decline in labor earnings depends both on the progressivity of the labor earnings
tax schedule – measured by τ1 – as well as on the preference parameters χ and γ. The
greater is their ratio χγ , the smaller we can expect the wealth effect on labor earnings to
be. Since we estimated τ1 from the data, the only thing that remains to pin down the
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wealth effects on labor earnings are the preference parameters. Note that, if labor taxes
were proportional (τ1 = 0), then the wealth effect on labor earnings would be solely
identified by their ratio χγ , which is not exactly true under a progressive tax system.
Yet, in a dynamic environment, agents want to distribute their consumption and leisure
gains from an exogenous wealth increase somewhat smoothly over their entire future
economic life. They do so by saving some of the wealth gain for future periods, lead-
ing to an elasticity ηa,t+1 > 0. The extent to which this consumption smoothing takes
place, i.e. the actual size of ηa,t+1, depends crucially on how strongly agents discount
the future. A small time discount factor β leads to a small change in assets (ηa,t+1) and
therefore to a pronounced labor supply reaction upon receipt of the exogenous wealth
transfers. A greater discount factor implies a shift of the labor supply reaction towards
later periods. Summing up, while the ratio of χγ governs the average size of the wealth
effect on labor earnings of a household over her remaining working life, the time dis-
count factor defines its shape. In the following, we use impulse response functions
over several years in order to simultaneously pin down these three parameters.
As outlined in the introduction, estimating the impact of inheritances on labor earn-
ings is empirically difficult, as studies can be expected to produce only biased results.
In particular, in the data – as in our model – inheritances are not a random and un-
expected treatment. Instead, agents rather adjust their economic decisions (such as
savings, consumption and labor supply) prior to their arrival, owing to an anticipa-
tion effect. A more reliable and convincing source of data comes from a recent study
by Cesarini et al. (2017). The authors evaluate the effect of winning the lottery on
individual labor earnings using a rich administrative data set of over 250,000 lottery
winners in Sweden. Their empirical estimates indicate a marginal propensity to earn
out of unearned income of -0.11 before labor taxes and social security contributions of
employers. When including employer contributions this number declines to -0.14.15
In order to pin down the wealth effect on labor earnings in our model, we directly use
the evidence from Cesarini et al. (2017). More specifically, we randomly pay out lot-
tery gains to our model households, using exactly the lottery size and age distribution
provided in their Computational Online Appendix. We then calculate the reduction
in labor earnings of all households in the first five years after they won the lottery,
measured as a fraction of the amount gained. We target an average annual reduction
in labor earnings of −1.07% of the lottery win. Our preferred choice of parameters
that matches these targets is γ = 1 and χ = 4.06. In our preference specification, this
implies a value for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.25, which is in line with
15 One concern of lottery studies typically is external validity, meaning that lottery players might be
systematically different from the Swedish population at large. Cesarini et al. (2017) address this issue
by pulling a random sample from the entire Swedish population, which can be done in Swedish
register data. After reweighing this random sample to match the demographic characteristics of
the sample of lottery winners, the authors find no significant difference in observable labor market
characteristics between lottery players and the general population.
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empirical estimates.16 Furthermore, we calibrate the discount factor β such that the
steepness of the impulse response function in the model matches its empirical coun-
terpart. Specifically, we target the difference in the labor earnings response in year one
and nine after the lottery win. We obtain the best match with a choice of β = 0.981.
A risk aversion of 1 and a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.25 both range at the lower
end of the spectrum typically found in the life cycle and the macroeconomic literature.
However, increasing both risk aversion and the Frisch labor supply elasticity to higher
values would significantly increase the wealth effect on labor earnings, which would
strongly enforce the labor tax revenue response to an increase in bequest taxes. How-
ever, this wealth effect would be inconsistent with empirical evidence. Yet, we provide
some sensitivity checks with respect to our parameter choices in Section 6, where we
set γ at a value smaller than 1, which directly implies a higher Frisch elasticity as well
as a value of γ = 4, which implies a high risk aversion.
Figure 5 reports the average impulse response functions of gross and net labor earnings
in our model for the first 10 years after a lottery win. Both the gross as well as the
(untargeted) net labor earnings response functions show a remarkably good fit with
the impulse response data provided in Cesarini et al. (2017). This is of course only
Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions in Data and Model
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true starting from year one, the year after the lottery gain, since lotteries are paid out
at some date throughout year 0, which creates an upward bias in the labor supply
response in the data. Note further that, albeit the fact that we paired lottery evidence
from Sweden with labor earnings data from Germany, we do get a good fit for both
impulse responses in Figure 5, which makes us confident that we do provide valid
estimates even with such a mixture of different data sources.
16 A Frisch elasticity of 0.25 is within the range of estimates provided in MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji
(1986) for prime age males. Blundell et al. (2016) find slightly higher values for the Frisch labor sup-
ply elasticity of males using a sample of married couples and values of around 1 for married females.
Fiorito and Zanella (2012) reconcile the consistency between micro- and macro-level estimates.
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6 Results
The policy experiment in our numerical simulation model is very similar to the one
in the theoretical analysis. Specifically, we assume that the government unexpectedly
increases the (proportional) tax rate on bequests by one percentage point. We start
from a case without any inheritance taxes which reflects the large exemption levels
for inheritance taxes in Germany. In fact, in our sample, only 2.8% of inheritances
were greater than the status quo exemption level of 400 000 Euros for individuals who
inherit from their parents. We, for now, focus on the effect a tax increase has on the life
cycle behavior of a generation that lives under the new bequest tax rate for all their life.
In Section 6.4, we illustrate how to measure the effects on short-run generations, who
get surprised by a bequest tax change at some date in the middle of their life cycle.
The column Total of Table 3 shows the effect of a one percentage point bequest tax
increase on the labor earnings and labor tax payments of one cohort. In particular,
we evaluate the change in the expected present value of labor earnings and labor tax
payments of one generation and relate it to the change in this generation’s expected
present value of bequest tax payments. The resulting number can be interpreted as the
excess tax revenue effect of a change in the bequest tax rate in the spirit of Corollary 2.
We find that a one percentage point bequest tax increase leads to an increase in gross
earnings of 21.7 cents for each Euro of additional bequest tax payments. This results in
a labor tax revenue increase of 8.9 cents.
Table 3: Effect of a 1% increase in bequest taxes
Decomposition
Total Anticipation Heirs Non-Heirs
Gross Earnings 21.66 10.52 11.80 −0.66
Labor Taxes 8.87 4.24 4.90 −0.27
Effects are measured as fraction of change in bequest tax revenue.
Our theoretical analysis has shown that the present value of labor earnings and labor
tax changes can be decomposed into three components, confer (11):
1. Labor supply of heirs increases owing to the direct negative wealth effect induced
by a bequest tax increase.
2. The anticipation effect causes households to smooth their labor earnings reaction
over the life cycle and leads to higher labor earnings and tax payments already
prior to the arrival of an inheritance.
3. As the anticipation effect involves an increase in savings, the resulting negative
wealth effect on older cohorts mitigates the earnings reaction of heirs and leads
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to a decline in labor earnings for non-heirs.
The extent of these effects is shown in the last three columns of Table 3. Both in terms
of labor earnings as well as in terms of tax payments, the anticipation effect is almost
as large as post-receipt effects. Before uncertainty regarding (potential) inheritances is
resolved, agents increase their labor earnings by on average 10.5 cents, leading to ad-
ditional tax revenues of about 4.2 cents per Euro of bequest taxes. After uncertainty is
resolved, those agents who actually inherit pay an additional 4.9 cents in labor income
taxes, while non-heirs reduce their tax payments by 0.3 cents.
Our modeling assumption of rational agents with realistic expectations regarding size
and timing of bequests implies that anticipation effects are sizable and almost as high
as post-receipt effects. In Section 6.6, we discuss a different version of the model in
which we postulate that agents are myopic and do not anticipate bequests at all. We
show that in such a case, while anticipation effects are by construction zero, post-
receipt effects of heirs are higher than the ones we observe here, as myopic individuals
do not smooth their labor supply reaction over the entire life cycle.
6.1 Illustrating the Mechanism
We now want to elaborate a bit more on the mechanism at work. To this end, Figure
6 shows the change in life cycle savings (upper panels) and earnings (lower panels) in
Euro values that results from the one percentage point increase in bequest taxes. As an
example, we picked households from a moderate earning class (e = 6), who’s parents
die at the age of 50. On the left hand side, we plot life-cycle graphs for agents who
are endowed with a signal of s = 1 at the beginning of the life cycle, and therefore
only expect a very small inheritance. The right hand side shows the same plots for
households with a signal of s = 4, who consequently expect their inheritance to fall
into class i = 4 with probability 0.78 (for a signal quality of σ = 0.75). The different
lines denote the actual inheritance the household receives i = 0, . . . , 4.
The figure shows that upon the increase in bequest taxes, both household types – those
with a low and those with a high signal – increase their savings throughout the life
cycle, up to the point where they receive an inheritance. Since households with a high
signal expect a larger inheritance and therefore experience a greater wealth effect (at
least in expectation), their savings reaction is much more pronounced than for the low
signal households. Once the inheritance is received, on the other hand, savings typ-
ically drop below steady state levels, which is a direct result of the negative wealth
effect induced by the bequest tax.
The lower panels of Figure 6 illustrate the importance of the anticipation effect, which
first and foremost causes labor earnings to already increase prior to the date at which
the household receives an inheritance. As with life-cycle savings, for individuals who
expect a large inheritance (s = 4), this effect is much more pronounced than for agents
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Figure 6: Change in life-cycle behavior of different households
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with a low signal. Yet, the anticipation effect has a second component: It dampens the
labor earning reaction in case the agent receives an inheritance that is greater than her
expected inheritance level and causes labor earnings to fall below initial steady state
levels in case the expected inheritance is small. Of course, the household endowed
with signal s = 4 has a much higher expectation than the one with s = 1. Hence, labor
earnings of the former fall for all inheritance levels but i = 4.
6.2 Heterogeneity of Effects
Table 4 shows the effects of a one percentage point increase in the bequest tax for house-
holds of different earnings classes. In order to control for differences in expected be-
quests, we normalize the earnings and labor tax effects using the expected present
value of bequest tax payments for each earnings level. We find a substantial amount
of heterogeneity across labor productivity groups. Specifically, within each education
group, higher earnings class households exhibit a greater reaction in labor supply. This
relationship can be understood by realizing that the intratemporal first order condition
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Table 4: Effect of a 1% increase in bequest taxes by Earnings-Class
Low Education High Education
e = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Earnings 15.01 20.57 21.53 24.07 16.30 20.22 23.40 24.38
Taxes 4.57 7.52 8.47 10.34 5.65 8.01 9.87 11.19
Effects are measured as fraction of change in bequest tax revenue by earnings class.
in our model implies
yt =
[
1− T ′(yt)
] 1
χ · w1+
1
χ
t · (ct)−
γ
χ ,
see (15) in Appendix C. From this follows that for any decline in consumption ct (which
would be the result of a bequest tax increase), a household with a higher labor produc-
tivity will always increase her labor earnings to a greater extent than an agent with low
labor productivity.
In economic terms, a higher labor productivity allows a household to counteract chan-
ges in exogenous income much easier than an agent with low labor productivity, since
a one unit change in labor hours just leads to a much higher change in earnings for the
former than for the latter. Or put it differently, a one hour reduction in leisure due to
lower wealth translates into a larger increase in earnings and therefore consumption
the larger the hourly wage is. Note that the heterogeneity in labor tax changes is larger
than the heterogeneity in earnings effects across earnings classes. The reason is that,
owing to the progressive labor tax schedule, households with higher labor productivity
face much higher marginal tax rates.
6.3 The Role of Signal Quality
In our benchmark simulation, we chose a signal quality of σ = 0.75. Figure 7 shows the
sensitivity of our results with respect to this signal quality.17 Recall that for σ = 0, the
signal contains no information and all households use the cross-sectional distribution
of bequests in their earnings class to forecast the size of their inheritance. For σ = 1,
the signal is fully informative and households know exactly in which class their inheri-
tance is going to fall. On the vertical axis of the figure, we again report the excess labor
tax effect per unit of additional bequest tax revenue, when we increase the bequest tax
rate by one percentage point. We find that, for any σ 1, labor taxes increase by about
the same amount of roughly 8.5 to 9 cents per Euro of additional bequest tax revenue,
regardless of the quality of the signal.
17 Note that we only vary signal quality and do not recalibrate the labor supply elasticity parameter χ.
We however checked for certain combinations that our results also hold under recalibration of χ.
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Figure 7: Varying Signal Quality
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Only when the signal quality approaches 1, this suddenly changes and the excess la-
bor tax revenue increases to about 10 cents. The reason for this can be found in the
natural borrowing constraint (Aiyagari, 1994) of a household. Whenever the signal is
less than fully informative, a household can make some forecast about her future in-
heritance. Yet, there still is the possibility that the agent ends up inheriting nothing.
Households would obviously like to distribute the benefits of the expected bequest
(that are typically received around the age of 50 to 60) evenly over the life cycle. Those
with a higher expected inheritance might therefore even run into debt against future
bequest transfers. The amount of debt they can hold is limited by the natural borrow-
ing constraint. In case there is even a slight chance of inheriting nothing, the agent has
to make sure that she can still service her debt in case she gets no bequest from her
parents. Hence, her natural borrowing limit is relatively tight, even if on average she
expects a large bequest. This suddenly changes with a fully informative signal. In this
case, the only remaining uncertainty is the uncertainty about timing. But eventually,
every household with a positive signal will receive a positive bequest. Hence, life-cycle
smoothing works much better in this scenario, as the natural borrowing constraint is
relaxed. As a result, agents who have a high expectation about bequests will also react
much stronger to changes in bequest taxes. In Figure 7 this fact can be seen when com-
paring the change in excess labor taxes for households from a low earnings class, who
on average have low expectations about inheritances, with those from a high earnings
class.
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6.4 The Short vs. the Long Run
So far, we only focused on the effect of a change in the bequest tax rate on a cohort
that has lived under the new bequest tax rate for their whole life. However, as already
pointed out in the theoretical analysis, there is a difference between such cohorts and
generations that are surprised by a change in bequest taxes at some date in the middle
of their life cycle. In the following, we therefore conduct the same thought experiment
as in our theoretical analysis. We assume that the economy is in a steady state with a
bequest tax rate of 0%. Then, the government surprisingly increases the bequest tax
rate by one percentage point. Figure 8 then shows the excess labor tax effect on cohorts
with different ages at the time of the reform. Of course, for the cohort aged 1, we again
get the very same number as in previous sections, as this cohort is the one that lives
under the new tax system for their whole life span.
Figure 8: Short-run vs. Long-run Effects
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The older a cohort is at the time the bequest tax rate changes, the less years of work
remain to react to the tax change. Consequently, the excess labor tax effect declines in a
cohort’s age almost everywhere. Only for very young cohorts, we see a slight increase
in excess tax revenue, which is due to a denominator effect. Since bequests are most
likely to arrive at later ages, the labor earnings effect for cohorts between ages 20 and
30 at the time of the reform is almost identical. However, as some inheritances do
arrive at these ages, the present value of bequest tax revenue (the denominator in the
excess tax revenue effect) decreases in age, which causes the overall excess labor tax
effect to increase slightly.
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6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed in section 5.3, we have three parameters – the coefficient of relative risk
aversion γ, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply χ, and the discount factor
β – in order to match two targets – the propensity to earn out of lottery gains in the five
years following the lottery win, and the steepness of the impulse response function in
labor earnings. Our benchmark calibration of γ = 1, χ = 4.06, and β = 0.981 implies
that both risk aversion and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply are in the range of em-
pirical estimates, even though both are at the lower end of this range. In this section
we provide robustness checks to this choice. Specifically, we consider the case of a rela-
tively high Frisch elasticity of 0.5 (χ = 2.0). In order for the model to match the lottery
evidence on labor earnings, this yet implies that risk aversion needs to be extremely
low (γ = 0.51). Similarly, we consider the other extreme case of a high risk aversion
(γ = 4.0), even though this implies an extremely low Frisch labor supply elasticity of
0.06 (χ = 16.8) and a time discount factor β > 1. For each of these calibrations, we
compute the effect of a marginal increase in bequest taxes on labor earnings and excess
labor income taxes. Table 5 summarizes the results.
Table 5: Effect of a 1% increase in bequest taxes
γ = 0.51, χ = 2.0 and β = 0.9715
Total Anticipation Heirs Non-Heirs
Gross Earnings 22.32 11.41 11.64 −0.73
Labor Taxes 9.13 4.59 4.83 −0.29
γ = 4.0, χ = 16.8 and β = 1.04
Total Anticipation Heirs Non-Heirs
Gross Earnings 18.86 6.65 12.61 −0.40
Labor Taxes 7.76 2.69 5.24 −0.16
Effects are measured as fraction of change in bequest tax revenue.
Despite the very different parameterizations, our number of interest is affected only
modestly in both cases. In the case of a high labor supply elasticity and very low risk
aversion, it increases by a quarter of a cent to 9.13, while in the case of high risk aver-
sion and very low labor supply elasticity, it decreases by a bit more than one cent to
7.76. We further observe that for the parameterization with high risk aversion, antic-
ipation effects are much smaller than with low-risk-aversion individuals. The reason
for this is that highly risk averse household value the stochastic stream of (potential)
future bequests much less than their low risk averse counterparts. Consequently, they
are less willing to engage in consumption smoothing against this risky source of in-
come.
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6.6 Myopic vs. Forward Looking Agents
So far, we assumed that agents are fully rational, in the sense that they anticipate the
(potential) receipt of bequests. Consequently, they adjust their labor supply and sav-
ings decisions to changes in inheritance taxes already from the beginning of their eco-
nomic life. While this assumption is a natural benchmark, one might argue that in real-
ity, agents are not perfectly forward looking. In fact, the behavioral literature suggests
that agents often act myopically and don’t pay too much attention to (potential) future
events, see e.g. Gabaix (2019). To elaborate on this issue, we consider a polar case in
which agents do not anticipate the receipt of inheritances at all, but are completely sur-
prised by the arrival of a bequest. In this version of the model, an inheritance triggers
responses equivalent to those after a lottery win and anticipation effects are absent by
construction.
We again perform our policy experiment and increase the inheritance tax from zero to
1%. The results are shown in Table 6. In total, labor earnings increase by about 14.3
Table 6: Effect of a 1% increase in bequest taxes, myopic agents
Decomposition
Total Anticipation Heirs Non-Heirs
Gross Earnings 14.32 0.00 14.32 0.00
Labor Taxes 5.97 0.00 5.97 0.00
Effects are measured as fraction of change in bequest tax revenue.
cents per Euro of mechanically raised bequest tax revenue. Labor income taxes rise
by almost 6 cents. Both of these numbers are by about one third lower than in the
benchmark case of forward looking agents, see Table 3. Of course, the anticipation ef-
fect is zero by assumption and, after uncertainty about bequests is resolved, only heirs
respond to the change in taxes. Yet, the increase in heirs’ labor earnings (and there-
fore income taxes paid) is greater than the post-receipt response of anticipating heirs
in the benchmark case. The reason is that fully rational heirs distribute the burden of
a bequest tax increase over their whole life-cycle using adjustments in savings. My-
opic heirs, however, fail to internalize this burden prior to the inheritance receipt and
consequently have to react more strongly afterwards. However, as most inheritances
arrive rather late in life, their scope of action is rather limited. As a result, their overall
labor supply response is much lower than the total response of a rational individual.
6.7 Borrowing Limits
In our benchmark calibration we assumed that amin = −∞, meaning that as long as
a household can service her debt until she dies, she can run into debt as much as she
33
wishes. In this section, we look at the other extreme case, in which no borrowing is
allowed at all (amin = 0). We again fix the parameter γ = 1 and re-calibrate χ and β
in order to replicate the empirical evidence on earnings responses of lottery winners
(Cesarini et al., 2017). Specifically, we need to reduce χ to a value of 3.52, leading
to a Frisch elasticity of 0.28 (instead of 0.25 in our benchmark case), and increase the
discount factor to β = 0.988. Figure 9 again compares the average impulses of gross
and net earnings in data and the model.
Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions in Data and Model with Strict Borrowing Limit
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The results of our policy experiment (increasing the bequest tax from zero to 1%) under
this new calibration are presented in Table 7. Since the Frisch elasticity is now higher
Table 7: Effect of a 1% increase in bequest taxes, no borrowing
γ = 1.0, χ = 3.52 and β = 0.988
Total Anticipation Heirs Non-Heirs
Gross Earnings 24.86 12.59 12.84 −0.57
Labor Taxes 10.27 5.18 5.33 −0.23
Effects are measured as fraction of change in bequest tax revenue.
than in the benchmark scenario, both the labor supply and the labor tax reaction to a
change in the bequest tax are more pronounced, with the tax effect being 10.3 cents
instead of 8.9 cents. As before, anticipation and post-receipt effects are of similar mag-
nitude. Figure 10 again depicts the changes in life-cycle profiles of savings and labor
earnings for agents who inherit at age 50. The strict no-borrowing limit makes it harder
for agents to smooth consumption and labor supply over the life-cycle. While in the
case of amin = −∞ the increase in the bequest tax resulted in an increase of earnings
and savings already from age 20, now this is true only from age 25 onwards, at which
the borrowing constraint stops binding.
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Figure 10: Change in life-cycle behavior of different households
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In sum, the analysis of this section suggests that our assumption of no exogenous bor-
rowing limits leads to rather conservative estimates for the labor supply effects of be-
quest taxes. If borrowing limits actually play an important role in reality, our number
of interest would be even larger than the 9 cents we obtained in our benchmark simu-
lations.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we theoretically and quantitatively characterize the effects of inheritance
tax increases on public finances. We focus on one particular channel through which tax
revenues are affected: labor supply increases of (potential) heirs as a result of negative
wealth effects and the corresponding increase in labor tax revenues. In a theoretical
framework we derive the full fiscal impact of an of an increase in bequest taxes and
isolate the channel through wealth effect of heirs. This channel can be decomposed
into: a direct wealth effect on heirs, and an anticipation effect on all individuals even prior
to the receipt of an inheritance.
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We then quantify the labor tax revenue effect of bequest taxes using a state of the
art life-cycle model that is calibrated to match clean quasi-experimental evidence on
wealth effects of lottery winners. In our preferred calibration, for each Euro of inheri-
tance taxes that the government collects, it gets on average an additional 9 cents from
increased labor income tax payments of heirs and of agents who do not inherit, but
expect to with a certain probability. This is a sizable effect and should therefore be
taken into account in dynamic scoring exercises, in which revenues of tax changes are
simulated.
One margin that we do not account for and which could make the effects even stronger
are education decisions. It is likely that individuals do not only make their labor supply
choices conditional on their expectations about inheritances, but also adjust the acqui-
sition of human capital accordingly. In that sense, an increase in inheritance taxes could
also imply a positive effect on the education of heirs, which would imply another posi-
tive effect on labor income tax revenue. In addition, we only consider intensive margin
labor supply adjustments, while extensive labor supply choices might also play a role.
This could be especially true for households who receive an inheritance very late in
their working life and adjust their retirement behavior accordingly.
As we discuss in our theoretical analysis, inheritance taxes also affect the amount of
bequests agents want to leave to their descendants. This in turn has consequences for
lifetime labor supply and therefore tax revenue. Moreover, we showed that intergen-
erational spillovers through these bequeathing decisions imply that the size of wealth
effects, and hence induced labor income tax revenues, varies across different gener-
ations. Quantifying these channels requires an accurate modeling of the motives to
leave bequests. This is a difficult task, since “[t]he literature on bequest motives has
failed to identify the single motive and instead points to both mixed motives present
at the same time for a given person and to heterogeneity in preferences in the popula-
tion” (Kopczuk, 2013a, p.381). Nevertheless, in order to obtain a fully comprehensive
picture of the fiscal effects of inheritance taxation, future research should pursue this
avenue.
36
References
Aiyagari, S. R. (1994). Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 109(3):659–684.
Altonji, J. (1986). Intertemporal substitution in labor supply: Evidence from micro
data. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3):S176–S215.
Benabou, R. (2002). Tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy: What
levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency? Econometrica, 70(2):481–
517.
Bick, A., Fuchs-Schündeln, N., and Lagakos, D. (2018). How do hours worked vary
with income? cross-country evidence and implications. American Economic Review,
108(1):170–99.
Blundell, R., Pistaferri, L., and Saporta-Eksten, I. (2016). Consumption inequality and
family labor supply. American Economic Review, 106(2):387–435.
Bø, E. E., Halvorsen, E., and Thoresen, T. O. (2018). Heterogeneity of the carnegie effect.
Journal of Human Resources, pages 0915–7366R1.
Brown, J. R., Coile, C. C., and Weisbenner, S. J. (2010). The effect of inheritance receipt
on retirement. Review of Economics and Statistics, 92:425–434.
Cesarini, D., Lindqvist, E., Notowidigdo, M. J., and Ostling, R. (2017). The effect of
wealth on individual and household labor supply: Evidence from swedish lotteries.
American Economic Review, 107(12):3917–3946.
de Nardi, M., French, E., and Jones, J. (2010). Why do the elderly save? the role of
medical expenses. Journal of Political Economy, 118(1):39–75.
Doorley, K. and Pestel, N. (2016). Labor supply after inheritances and the role of ex-
pectations. IZA Discussion Paper.
Elinder, M., Erixson, O., and Ohlsson, H. (2012). The impact of inheritances on heirs’
labor and capital income. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12(1).
Fiorito, R. and Zanella, G. (2012). The anatomy of the aggregate labor supply elasticity.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 15(2):171–187.
Gabaix, X. (2019). Behavioral inattention. forthcoming in: Bernheim, D., DellaVigna,
S., and Laibson, D., Handbook of Behavioral Economics, Volume 1, North Holland.
Gelber, A., Moore, T. J., and Strand, A. (2017). The effect of disability insurance
payments on beneficiaries’ earnings. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
9(3):229–61.
37
Heathcote, J., Storesletten, K., and Violante, G. (2017). Optimal tax progressivity: An
analytical framework. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4):1693–1754.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., and Rosen, H. S. (1993). The carnegie conjecture: Some
empirical evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2):413–435.
Imbens, G. W., Rubin, D. B., and Sacerdote, B. I. (2001). Estimating the effect of un-
earned income on labor earnings, savings, and consumption: Evidence from a sur-
vey of lottery players. American Economic Review, pages 778–794.
Koeniger, W. and Prat, J. (2018). Human capital and optimal redistribution. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 27:1–26.
Kopczuk, W. (2013a). Chapter 6 - taxation of intergenerational transfers and wealth. In
Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, M. F. and Saez, E., editors, Handbook of Public Economics,
vol. 5, volume 5 of Handbook of Public Economics, pages 329–390. Elsevier.
Kopczuk, W. (2013b). Incentive effects of inheritances and optimal estate taxation.
American Economic Review, 103(3):472–77.
Lorenz, N. and Sachs, D. (2016). Identifying laffer bounds: A sufficient statistics ap-
proach with an application to germany. The Scandinacian Journal of Economics, forth-
coming.
MaCurdy, T. (1981). An empirical model of labor supply in a life-cycle setting. Journal
of Political Economy, 89(6):1059–1085.
OECD (2017). Pensions at a Glance 2017: OECD and G20 Indicators. OECD Publishing,
Paris.
Picchio, M., Suetens, S., and Van Ours, J. C. (2015). Labor supply effects of winning a
lottery. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10929.
Piketty, T. (2011). On the long-run evolution of inheritance: France 1820–2050. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3):1071–1131.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2013). A theory of optimal inheritance taxation. Econometrica,
81(5):1851–1886.
Saez, E. (2001). Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 68(1):205–229.
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., and Giertz, S. H. (2012). The elasticity of taxable income with
respect to marginal tax rates: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1):3–
50.
Wagner, G., Frick, J., and Schupp, J. (2007). The german socio-economic panel study
(soep) - scope, evolution and enhancements. Journal of Applied Social Science Studies,
127(1):139–169.
38
Appendix
A Proofs for 2 Period OLG model
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us assume that our model is in a steady state, meaning that all variables are con-
stant over time. We will work ourselves backwards through the model, starting with
period 2 of the household choice problem.
The household problem in period 2 Given a certain level of household savings a, a house-
hold of type K = I, N maximizes her remaining life time utility given her instantaneous
budget constraint. It is useful to write the optimization problem in terms of labor earn-
ings yK2 = w2l
K
2 as
max
cK2 ,y
K
2 ,b
K
v
(
cK2 ,
yK2
w2
, (1− τb)bK
)
s.t. cK2 + b
K ≤ (1− τl)yK2 + (1+ r)a + 1K=I(1− τb)b + T2
Let’s for expositional purposes write the net bequest level a household leaves to her de-
scendants as bKnet = (1− τb)bK. The first order conditions of the optimization problem
then read
−
vl
(
cK2 ,
yK2
w2
, bKnet
)
w2(1− τl) = vc
(
cK2 ,
yK2
w2
, bKnet
)
= (1− τb)vb
(
cK2 ,
yK2
w2
, bKnet
)
.
Using the implicit function theorem, we get[
vcc +
vlc
w2(1− τl)
]
dcK2 +
[
(1− τb)vcb + (1− τb)vlbw2(1− τl)
]
dbK
= −
{[
vcl
w2(1− τl) +
vll
[w2(1− τl)]2
]
(1− τl)dyK2 +
[
vcb · b
K
b
+
vlb · bKb
w2(1− τl)
]
d(1− τb) · b
}
as well as[
(1− τb)vbc + vlcw2(1− τl)
]
dcK2 +
[
(1− τb)2vbb + (1− τb)vlbw2(1− τl)
]
dbK
= −
{[
(1− τb)vbl
w2(1− τl) +
vll
[w2(1− τl)]2
]
(1− τl)dyK2
+
[
(1− τb)vbb · b
K
b
+
vlb · bKb
w2(1− τl) + vb ·
1
b
]
d(1− τb) · b
}
.
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Note that we use vxy as abbreviation for vxy
(
cK2 ,
yK2
w2
, bKnet
)
.
These two equations constitute a linear equation system in dcK2 and db
K, which (under
some regularity assumptions) has a unique solution[
dcK2
dbK
]
= −
[
ξK2cy ξ
K
2cτ
ξK2by ξ
K
2bτ
]
·
[
(1− τl)dyK2
d(1− τb) · b
]
Assuming that no resources are put to waste, total differentiation of the budget con-
straint yields
dcK2 + db
K = (1− τl)dyK2 + (1+ r)da + 1K=I · d [(1− τb)b] + dT2
which under substitution of the above relationships brings us to
dyK2 =
−(1+ r)da− 1i=k · d [(1− τb)b]− dT2 −
(
ξK2cτ + ξ
K
2bτ
) · d(1− τb) · b
(1− τl)
[
1+ ξK2cy + ξ
K
2by
] .
From this relationship, we directly see that the labor earnings reaction to a pure change
in exogenous income dT2, keeping savings da, bequests received d [(1− τb)b] and the
net-of-tax rate d(1− τb) fixed, is
dyK2
dT2
∣∣∣∣∣
da=0
= − 1
(1− τl)
[
1+ ξK2cy + ξ
K
2by
] =: −ηK2 .
At the same time, we immediately get with dT2 = 0 that
dyK2 = η
K
2 ·
{
−1i=k · d [(1− τb)b]− (1+ r)da−
(
ξK2cτ + ξ
K
2bτ
)
· d(1− τb) · b
}
from which follows that
dyK2
d(1− τb) · b = η
K
2 ·
d [(1− τb)b]
d(1− τb) · b
{
−1i=k − (1+ r)dad [(1− τb)b]
}
− ηK2 ·
(
ξK2cτ + ξ
K
2bτ
)
= ηK2 · (1+ ε) · [−1i=k + α]− ηK2 ·
(
ξK2cτ + ξ
K
2bτ
)
,
with ε being the elasticity of total bequests b received by the household with respect to
the net of tax rate 1− τb. Let us further define ξKτ = −
(
ξK2cτ + ξ
K
2bτ
)
, which measures
the effect of a change in the net-of-tax-rate 1− τb on the willingness of a household to
bequeath to her own descendants. Then by substituting ξKτ into the above equation,
we obtain the second part of (6).
The household problem in period 1 Let us define
V(a) = pi · max
cI2,y
I
2,b
I
v
(
cI2,
yI2
w2
, bI
)
+ (1− pi) max
cN2 ,y
N
2 ,b
N
v
(
cN2 ,
yN2
w2
, bN
)
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subject to the second period budget constraints. Then, using Bellman’s principle of
optimality, we can write the first period optimization problem as
max
c1,y1,a
u
(
c1,
y1
w1
)
+ βV(a) s.t. c1 + a = (1− τl)y1 + T1.
The first order conditions with respect to c1 and y1 read
−
ul
(
c1,
y1
w1
)
w1(1− τl) = uc
(
c1,
y1
w1
)
.
Using the implicit function theorem yields
dc1 = − ull + [w1(1− τl)] · ucl
[w1(1− τl)]2 · ucc + [w1(1− τl)] · ulc︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ξc1
·(1− τl)dy1.
Assuming that no resources are put to waste, total differentiation of the budget con-
straint yields
dc1 + da = (1− τl)dy1 + dT1
which under substitution of the above relationships brings us to
dy1 = −
dT1 − (1+r)da1+r
(1− τl) [1+ ξc1] .
From this relationship, we directly see that the labor earnings reaction to a pure change
in exogenous income is
dy1
dT1
∣∣∣∣
da=0
= − 1
(1− τl) [1+ ξc1] =: −η1.
At the same time, we immediately get with dT = 0 that
dy1
d(1− τb) · b = −
η1
1+ r
· d [(1− τb)b]
d(1− τb) · b ·
[
− (1+ r)da
d [(1− τb)b]
]
= − η1
1+ r
· (1+ ε) · α.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The total differential of the life time tax revenue (5) of a generation born at date t is
dRt = τl ·
[
dy1t +
pidyI2t+1 + (1− pi)dyN2t+1
1+ r
]
+
pid [τbbt+1]
1+ r
.
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Note that we made the assumption that neither the labor earnings tax rate nor lump-
sum transfers are affected by the change in dτb. We can write this equation as
dRt =
pid [τbbt+1]
1+ r
·
{
1+ τl · d(1− τb) · bt+1d [τbbt+1] ·
1+ r
pi
· dy1td(1− τb) · bt+1 +
pi
dyI2t+1
d(1−τb)·bt+1 + (1− pi)
dyN2t+1
d(1−τb)·bt+1
1+ r
}.
We then obtain
1+ r
pi
·
 dy1td(1− τb) · bt+1 +
pi
dyI2t+1
d(1−τb)·bt+1 + (1− pi)
dyN2t+1
d(1−τb)·bt+1
1+ r

=
1+ r
pi
·
[
− η1(1+ εt+1)
1+ r
· α
+
pi
[
η I2(1+ εt+1) [−1+ α] + η I2 · ξ Iτ
]
+ (1− pi) [ηN2 (1+ εt+1)α+ ηN2 ξNτ ]
1+ r
]
= − 1
pi
·
{
(1+ εt+1)
[
η1 · α+ pi
[
η I2 − αη I2
]
+ (1− pi)
[
αηN2
]]
−
[
piη I2χ
I
τ + (1− pi)ηN2 χNτ
]}
Furthermore we get
d(1− τb) · bt+1
d [τbbt+1]
=
d(1− τb) · bt+1
τbdbt+1 + dτbbt+1
=
d(1− τb) · bt+1
τbdbt+1 − d(1− τb)bt+1
=
1
τb
1−τb ·
(1−τb)dbt+1
d(1−τb)bt+1 − 1
= − 1
1− τb1−τb · εt+1
.
Putting all of this together yields (8).
The equation for the cohort born at time s − 1, i.e. right before the bequest tax is in-
creased, then simply follows from the fact that this cohort has – by definition – a sav-
ings reaction of α = 0 and at the same time bequests are predetermined εs = 0. 
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B Calibration data extracted from GSOEP
Table 8: Mean labor earnings in different earnings classes
Low Education High Education
Age e = 1 e = 2 e = 3 e = 4 e = 5 e = 6 e = 7 e = 8
20-24 3,126 8,947 16,061 31,182 2,676 9,070 19,407 36,026
25-29 6,342 16,614 26,748 42,639 7,274 21,607 35,064 55,638
30-34 11,544 23,854 32,762 50,884 18,828 34,868 46,228 73,596
35-39 13,965 26,082 34,988 52,340 22,071 38,341 50,761 81,618
40-44 15,216 27,946 37,049 56,708 22,313 39,453 53,004 89,428
45-49 14,184 27,929 38,173 59,408 22,582 40,171 54,511 94,091
50-54 12,547 26,578 37,469 60,999 21,083 40,803 56,316 98,965
55-59 10,328 22,015 33,568 58,279 15,927 36,203 53,249 96,778
60-64 9,002 15,500 23,521 45,613 12,640 26,474 42,283 76,568
65+ 8,527 13,122 16,634 28,023 10,756 16,888 22,562 45,823
Share 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
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Table 9: Fraction of heirs and mean bequest level by earnings class (low education)
Age Frac. Heirs (in %) Mean Bequest Frac. Heirs (in %) Mean Bequest
e = 1 e = 2
20-34 0.84 26,579 0.61 53,812
(0.14) (9,659) (0.11) (16,780)
35-44 0.81 39,176 1.19 31,761
(0.13) (10,543) (0.15) (6,165)
45-54 1.11 68,150 1.08 49,147
(0.15) (15,992) (0.15) (8,699)
55-64 1.25 52,864 1.17 51,501
(0.18) (10,495) (0.16) (8,282)
65+ 0.60 46,869 0.52 46,197
(0.09) (9,562) (0.08) (11,311)
e = 3 e = 4
20-34 1.43 23,577 1.20 73,607
(0.17) (5,573) (0.16) (18,286)
35-44 0.92 73,587 1.37 52,417
(0.14) (20,388) (0.16) (15,080)
45-54 1.89 63,092 1.92 131,542
(0.19) (18,833) (0.17) (26,858)
55-64 1.54 93,182 2.51 70,160
(0.18) (16,922) (0.21) (10,216)
65+ 0.58 47,055 1.04 62,391
(0.09) (9,451) (0.11) (17,901)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 10: Fraction of heirs and mean bequest by earnings class (high education)
Age Frac. Heirs (in %) Mean Bequest Frac. Heirs (in %) Mean Bequest
e = 5 e = 6
20-34 1.73 72,007 1.14 33,552
(0.34) (28,507) (0.26) (10,246)
35-44 0.81 46,598 1.22 35,946
(0.18) (16,519) (0.21) (9,806)
45-54 2.38 54,616 1.67 68,809
(0.31) (10,300) (0.24) (18,128)
55-64 2.04 55,539 3.11 94,364
(0.31) (12,675) (0.36) (16,702)
65+ 1.13 69,136 0.88 103,915
(0.21) (15,121) (0.17) (26,950)
e = 7 e = 8
20-34 2.03 281,532 2.05 81,609
(0.36) (107,188) (0.38) (22,610)
35-44 1.47 31,910 1.85 95,899
(0.23) (5,146) (0.25) (16,113)
45-54 2.68 55,250 2.50 112,098
(0.28) (11,426) (0.25) (24,719)
55-64 2.75 97,200 3.87 127,256
(0.33) (16,277) (0.33) (38,036)
65+ 2.33 76,044 2.52 133,747
(0.28) (12,190) (0.27) (22,585)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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C Wealth effect on labor earnings
The dynamic household optimization problem in our model reads
Vt(e, s, ht, Wt) = max
ct,lt,at+1
{
c1−γt
1− γ −
l1+χt
1+ χ
+ βE
[
Vt+1 (e, s, ht+1, Wt+1)
∣∣∣e, s, ht]}
subject to the budget constraint
ct + at+1 = wet lt − T (wet lt) + P et +Wt,
where P et = 0 for all workers. We can write the Lagrangean for a working age house-
hold as
L = c
1−γ
t
1− γ −
l1+χt
1+ χ
+ βE [Vt+1 (e, s, ht+1, Wt+1)] + µ [wet lt − T (wet lt) +Wt − ct − at+1] .
First order conditions with respect to consumption and labor effort are
(ct)−γ − µ = 0 and (yt)χ = µ ·
[
1− T ′(yt)
] · (wet)1+χ. (15)
Together with the budget constraint, this leads to
F(yt, Wt, at+1) := (yt)χ − [yt − T (yt) +Wt − at+1]−γ ·
[
1− T ′(yt)
] · (wet)1+χ = 0,
which implicitly defines labor earnings. The implicit function theorem then implies
∂F
∂yt
· dyt + ∂F
∂Wt
· dWt + ∂F
∂at+1
· dat+1 = 0
⇔
[
χ(yt)χ−1 + γ(ct)−γ−1 ·
[
1− T ′(yt)
]2 · (wet)1+χ − (ct)−γ · (−T ′′(yt)) · (wet)1+χ] · dyt
+
[
γ(ct)−γ−1 ·
[
1− T ′(yt)
] · (wet)1+χ] · dWt
−
[
γ(ct)−γ−1 ·
[
1− T ′(yt)
] · (wet)1+χ] · dat+1 = 0
⇔ χ(yt)
χ−1 + γ(ct)−γ−1 · [1− T ′(yt)]2 · (wet)1+χ + (ct)−γ · T ′′(yt) · (wet)1+χ
γ(ct)−γ−1 · [1− T ′(yt)] · (wet)1+χ
· dyt
= −dWt ·
[
1− dat+1
dWt
]
⇔
[
χ
γ
· ct
yt
· (yt)
χ
(ct)−γ · [1− T ′(yt)] · (wet)1+χ
+ 1− T ′(yt) + ct
γ
· T
′′(yt)
1− T ′(yt)
]
dyt
dwt
= −
[
1− dat+1
dWt
]
From the first order conditions of the household problem, we directly get
(yt)χ
(ct)−γ · [1− T ′(yt)] · (wet)1+χ
= 1.
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Furthermore, using the functional form of our tax function yields
1− T ′(yt) = (1− τ1) · yt − T (yt)yt and
T ′′(yt)
1− T ′(yt) = −
τ1
yt
.
Hence, we obtain
dyt
dWt
= − 1−
dat+1
dWt
χ+τ1
γ · ctyt + (1− τ1) ·
yt−T (yt)
yt
.
Consequently, we can write the wealth effect on labor earnings in form of an elasticity
as
ηy,t =
dyt
dWt
· Wt
yt
= − Wt − at+1 · ηa,t+1χ+τ1
γ · ct + (1− τ1) · [yt − T (yt)]
,
with ηa,t+1 being the elasticity of savings into the next period with respect to current
wealth.

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